Who’s your favorite USN or WW2 person Morgane? You seem to like submarines a lot, so am I right in guessing Nimitz? Will they show up in Pacific?

Close. I hold a lot of admiration for a lot of our historical figures, and I tend to be more sympathetic than not for those that (I feel) got the short end of the stick – Jack Fletcher is a pretty good example. I also tend to defend (more so due to personal opinion, familial experiences (hard to hate your great uncle’s boss, for instance) or other impressions) individuals that may be controversial such as Mush Morton or Ted Sherman.

The latter I’ll answer first. Historical figures show up as either important background characters (E.G. Dwight Eisenhower, the KOG, and so on) or as “historical characters” in the form of ace fairies. The latter out of this group is infinitely easier for me to write, as according to Pacific lore, they are “locked” in time. That is to say, they possess only the knowledge and the “characteristics” up to that point, and the character is effectively frozen in time. So writing a Fuchida is easy because we know how he was during WW2. Writing the aging Fuchida as he appears, not as a fairy but himself in Pacific, is a bit more difficult.

As for the former group, in terms of background characters, you’ll notice that I tend to currently settle with descriptive elements only. After all, the only way to write them well is to read a lot of autobiographies, and you’ll be surprised to find that not two autobiographies are alike. Eisenhower is a prime example of this. I’ve gone through three separate autobiographies of him and combed his presidential library for personality tidbits before finally creating an “impression” of him as a character that I’d like to use. Each of those literally paint a different picture of the president, and I had to do a lot of thinking to synthesize all of those into one thing.

If I was to speak simply, Eisenhower’s a gentle giant. People trusted him. That was perhaps the more important out of all of his traits, and he took that trust seriously. He’s from a rural background, and reading up his experiences – both how he was raised and his experiences at West Point – convinced me that his folky farm-boy persona is both an act that he cultivates and something that is, well, him.

That being said, Eisenhower had an impeccable eye for policy. He is generally considered to be fairly good as a commanding officer in WW2. In real life he ended the Korean War after five months in his presidency and did not get us into another war. Nobody would know how many American and other lives he would have ultimately saved, but that part was particularly irrelevant when you consider that he was a man who stubbornly refused Congress, his advisors, and the Pentagon’s requests of a pre-emptive nuclear strike on countries such as China.

As such, a lot of the groundworks for how STEC grew in Pacific’s universe appeared because he made sense to me. This was after spending quite a bit of effort in trying to see what subtle tweaks can I make to his presidency to get America in Pacific to where I want – let’s just say that even now in 2017 I am ambivalent about the exact order of the presidents that would appear. This isn’t even about Clinton or Bush or Obama or Trump, but let’s just say that I’ve looked deeply into the timeline of Pacific, and I can totally see an America with no Kennedy or Reagan work.

But if you have to have me pick one historical figure to write that pertains to the USN it might come as a surprise to you.

Due to a series of fortunate incidents, I am happy to say that I’ve read more about this man than a twenty-something should. Read Maury’s profile and you’ll quickly see the connection. To me, Arleigh Burke is basically the ur-example of a brilliant USN Navy Admiral. His actions in both peace and war, from childhood to CNO, exemplifies what the Navy is about.

This is a man who not only innovated our destroyer tactics in WW2, but he helped shape the modern day US Navy, with his focus on carrier aviation, nuclear propulsion, and the Polaris missile. He served for six years as CNO – the longest of anyone to hold that office. But he was far more than just a hotshot DD commander, a capable CNO, or a living legend.

As a person? Burke is integrity personified. His work ethic is legendary, as is his drive and professionalism. He’s got a singleminded devotion to a few things in life – his country, the navy, his wife and little else. He spoke his mind and respected and expected others to do the same. Burke’s language can be surprisingly colorful at times.

It’s no wonder to anyone that he would leave but one word as his epitaph: Sailor.

 

We’re talking about a man who Secretary Tom Gates ordered to take time off because he was afraid that he would break down due to overwork. Sent to a luxury hotel resort in Virginia, Burke lasted a grand total of two days before fleeing back to Washington. He was just uncomfortable in that environment – after all, you’re talking about an admiral who didn’t golf or gamble (the only sport he was known to enjoy is Navy football which he follows religiously), and who sometimes work so hard that he forgets his own dinner parties.

And accomplished he was. By the end of his second term as CNO, he had not only shaped American policy, but he had ensured America’s future investments. USS Long Beach was nearly finished. The Enterprise – the first nuclear carrier – was almost done as well. His Naval Leadership Program is starting to generate immense amounts of talent. He kept the Navy independent, dampened the massive-retaliation strategy, and gotten a lot of younger officers into places where they could do their jobs.

Then there’s Polaris. You didn’t know that Burke was the one who launched the program, got the money for it, promoted it, and ultimately guided it, right?

But did you know what happened to him?

Burke, I don’t want the United States involved in this.

Kennedy’s angry response to Burke’s suggestions of naval during the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Burke himself was opposed to the invasion plans, and he was briefed at the barest of minimums in which – according to his memoirs – that he did not know even how to offer constructive criticism, so little did he know of the organization.

And so, when the debacle unfolded, Burke offered several ways to turn the battle around. He had units ready – he was opposed to it, but he was determined to salvage a bad situation. Kennedy flippantly blocked him at every turn, concerned as he was about the appearance of things. Burke, ever the consummate professional, only had this to say in response.

Hell, Mr. President, but we ARE involved!

When I read about Burke’s anger, something touched me deeply. Here was a man who will serve the nation faithfully for forty-two years, having survived World War II, the Korean War, and watched the Cold War begin.

He achieved greatness and became an actual living legend, he did so much for his country, and yet his last two years as CNO were spent trying to save the navy he loved so much from meddling bureaucrats and politicians. The air force, which first tried to block the development of Polaris, now wanted to take it over. He and a handful of farsighted individuals tried to warn the US of the extraordinary implications behind the “military reforms” (which, I will remind you, resulted in Vietnam…) but their warnings fell on largely deaf ears.

My impression, from reading the correspondences and the historical sources and hearing about the admiral from those who knew him, was that his last two years in office were distressing. The Bay of Pigs incident deeply affected him. He was tired. He was discouraged. He refused re-appointments and lucrative appointments to other offices and finally retired. In short, it was a tragic and somewhat unfulfilling end to the career of one of the most brilliant naval officers of US history.

You know how I started off on Pacific wanting to do something to “save” America – as I stated in that 2016 piece where I laid out my personal politics? That I wanted to make a stand against historical revisionism and what I saw as the slow degradation of our country?

There are a few individuals in history whose ends I felt were simply not fair. It’s a little like how they scrapped CV-6. It’s just …

It hurts.

I want to see if I can do something to mend that.

There are a handful of key historical figures involved in the Special Task and Evaluation Command, and Arleigh Burke is one of them.

Let’s just say I’m working on how he is portrayed and leave it at that.

This should probably be titled “Morgane argues with anons on the internet over history” –

Nah, I’m not really arguing. I am vigorously disagreeing. Also this is about the first time I’ve gotten comments on the IRL history as opposed to Pacific history/lore, so this takes precedent over some of the other comments (just look at how many things I’ve left unanswered from the forums or the channel or email…)

hello. regarding your post on the 19th 2017. you mentioned that the american pilots who flew at midway were greenhorns. while this is a general assumption i can assure you that with some digging this is the complete opposite case.

1: wildcats are in extreme short supply. and escorts were called off in an effort to increase the power of the bombing runs

2: thach’s wildcat flight engaged the zero swarm at a position of energy deficiency. aka, below.

3: 21 F2As were used on midway

it might be noted that of course. all 21 buffalos were smashed (well what did you expect they are like biplanes but worse), thach’s 6 cat flight slaughtered the zeroes with most members never getting the ‘thach weave’ briefing, and all ijn carriers went up in flames. if anything, i would say that the american crew at midway was just about equally skilled as their japanese counterpart. the japanese pilots however, probably didn’t expect wildcats to actually outmatch their zeroes.

I don’t think I can agree with that.

Commissioned officers they might be, but in the winter of 1941, these young brown-shoe officers, and their sometimes even younger backseat gunners and radiomen, for all their daredevil courage and enthusiasm, had nowhere near the length of service, the physical and mental training, or the combat experience of their Japanese counterparts. Nevertheless, in January of 1942, the three American carrier groups, with their embarked aircraft flown by young and untested pilots, were the only offensive weapons Nimitz had to hand, and he planned to use them aggressively. The Kidō Butai was supreme in the Pacific Ocean, but there were other targets of opportunity available to the American brown shoes.

Craig Symond, the Battle of Midway. Considered by many naval enthusiasts to be the best Midway book to come out to date.

I bring up this perspective because it is important to note that both the US and Japan were learning, which pre-empts a common and wrong impression that somehow six months into the Pacific war the US were suddenly Japan’s equal. As much as the US CVs racked up “experience” at Coral Sea, the Japanese CVs were also gaining experience considering that the Kidou Butai has been rampaging throughout the Pacific all the way up to that point as well.

In fact, US CV tactics did not mature prior to Towers/Sherman’s massive falling out. What made US CVs deadly was the doctrine involving the fast carrier task force, and that didn’t come about until 1943.

Other points to consider if you’ve done your digging.

• Yorktown’s flight group was a patchwork of pilots. Max Leslie’s VB-3 were reinforced from Saratoga, many of whom basically sat around after the Saratoga were torpedoed. Thach’s VF-3 had most of their veteran pilots sent to shore. His replacements includes that from the Ranger and other assorted pilots. Some hadn’t seen a carrier for months. Others haven’t served on one period. What’s more, VF-3’s veteran exec officer was killed a few days before Midway in an accident. Contrast this to the IJN air groups that has been training and fighting with each other since the beginning of the war. The advantage here, loathe as I am to admit it, still go slightly over to the IJN.
• Hornet’s pilots were completely green. Midway was their first combat. Even neglecting everything else 1/3rd of the US carrier airgroups are complete newbies. This experience is self-evident given the Hornet’s performance at Midway.
• Enterprise’s flight groups were veteran in that they had experience; this is still 1 on 4. Also, unlike the Yorktown planes, the Enterprise’s attack was less coordinated comparatively. Gray went home without engaging the Japanese, leaving Lindsay to fend for himself.
• The USMC pilots were a mixed bag. 21 pilots reinforced Midway on May 26th. 17 of those were fresh out of flight school, many with virtually no additional experience. Examples include the after-report from VMSB-241. Take a look yourself.

Emphasis in red, mine.

• The TBFs from what was supposed to be Hornet’s Torpedo 8 were also green. Haven’t seen combat at all.
• The 4 Army B-26s couldn’t even find the right course and had to be assisted by a friendly PBY to get to Midway.

You must have a very low opinion of the IJN to think that our guys up there were “just about equally skilled.”

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1: wildcats are in extreme short supply. and escorts were called off in an effort to increase the power of the bombing runs

Source? Because I have Fletcher’s logs in front of me right now. He has 18 Wildcats in total on Yorktown. He’s keeping 6 for CAP and 6 for VS-5, which wasn’t launched in that first attack wave. That leaves 6 to go with Thach. Don’t think he called off any escorts there.

2: thach’s wildcat flight engaged the zero swarm at a position of energy deficiency. aka, below.

3: 21 F2As were used on midway

it might be noted that of course. all 21 buffalos were smashed (well what did you expect they are like biplanes but worse), thach’s 6 cat flight slaughtered the zeroes with most members never getting the ‘thach weave’ briefing, and all ijn carriers went up in flames.

You have a weird definition of slaughter. For one thing, our torpedo bombers got slaughtered.

From Thach himself:

“six F4F-4 airplanes cannot prevent 20 or 30 Japanese VF from shooting down our slow torpedo planes.”

Secondly, for our own fighter performance? From Buckmaster, Captain of Yorktown:

“When about 4 miles from the Jap outer screen., which in turn was about 10- miles out from the CV’s, two AA bursts were fired by a Jap ship. These bursts were used evidently to direct the enemy Combat Air Patrol to our planes, for almost immediately afterwards our VT and VF were attacked by about 18-20 Zero fighters. Our VF formed a line astern formation in order to stay together and give the leader an opportunity to turn and fire at the attacking planes. Soon after this the rear fighter was shot down. The formation twisted and turned to prevent the Zeros from getting on their tails and also to obtain firing position. During the engagement our remaining 3 VF were able to shoot down 5 Zeros. The Zeros concentrated most of their attacks on the rear plane, making beam and astern runs and pulling clear after each run.

The two VF planes directly over the torpedo planes were able to furnish considerable support to the VT during the first part of the approach when there were only 4 Zeros attacking. But later they were joined by 6 more Zeros, and the 2 VF were too heavily out-numbered to be of much help. They shot down one Zero and possibly another, and saw one Zero shot down by the TBD rear seat men. Soon thereafter, they became separated from each other and from the torpedo planes. One of these fighters was badly damaged and crash landed on board the Hornet. The 4 remaining planes of the escort group landed on board. They lost one pilot and two planes and shot down 6 and damaged two Zeros in the engagement.”

So let’s break this down using American numbers.

2 VF scored one kill. They were outnumbered so this is par for the course. Thach & friends, 3 planes in all, were able to kill 5 Zeros despite being massively outnumbered. This is impressive, but it’s not anything close to a “slaughter.” You are right to say that the Japanese got a rude awakening. This seems to be the case based on what sources we can access from the Japanese.

However, Thach himself scored 3 out of the 5 kills. So I’d say this is really a case of Thach himself being quite good and the Japanese underestimating their opponents. I’m fairly certain if you cloned four of him and put him in this fight then yes, it might have been something of a slaughter, but as it was it was a good hit on the nose.

Also, on the Buffalo?

The Finns had a 26:1 kill ratio flying those Buffalos. Not saying that they were great airframes, but if you knew how to make ’em work, you can. 😉

if anything, i would say that the american crew at midway was just about equally skilled as their japanese counterpart. the japanese pilots however, probably didn’t expect wildcats to actually outmatch their zeroes.

The Wildcat did not “outmatch” the Zero at Midway. Spruance’s action report reads as follows, which sums up the majority of the feelings on the Wildcat for this battle.

“(k) The performance of our F4F-4 is reported as greatly inferior to the Jap “Zero” fighter. The ammunition supply for 6 guns of our VFs in inadequate. For use against the unprotected “Zero,” 4 machine guns instead of six in our F4F-4’s, with the weight saved used for additional ammunition, merits consideration. A new VF with greater range and maneuverability is required.”

By the way, the Wildcat actually didn’t do too poorly. Postwar assessment showed that it would fight the Zero to more or less parity as we figured out very quickly how to actually fight a Zero. It still managed a 5+ kill ratio in 1942.

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Anyways. At the end of the day, vigorous disagreements are what makes things fun. I mean, I do this so that people (myself included) can learn. So I hope you find my opinion – if not my answers – satisfactory. Thanks for dropping by.