[Historical Inspirations] 2017/06/03 – Prelude to Midway

Seventy-five years ago, on this day, the war was still looking bleak for the Allies. U-boats rampaged through the Atlantic. The Red Army was being ground down by Hitler’s assault on the Soviet Union. Rommel was trying to break into Egypt.

And, because Pacific focuses on, well, the Pacific, let’s not forget how the IJN rampaged through the Asia-Pacific over the last six months. We know – though the public might not – that Coral Sea was something of a draw. Tensions are high. This next battle would prove to be critical.

From the Japanese perspective, if they can draw out the US fleet in a good engagement and destroy it, they’ve then got the war in the bag. If they can decapitate the US naval forces here, then American would surely sue for peace and in the process, pay off Japan’s magnificent gamble back in ’41.

From the American perspective? The stakes were high. Midway’s strategic position cannot be understated. Coral Sea threw the Japanese slightly off balance, but if Midway is lost – along with its carrier defenders – then Japan will have another six months of free reign in the Pacific. US carriers were under production, but no new carriers could be brought in until at least the end of 1942.

Plenty of people’s written on Midway before. Many prominent historians and well-learned scholars all gave their own opinions on what this battle is. I can give you a good reading list if you’d like. Popping over on the Midway Round Table for an excellent review of books.

However, as we gear up vol. 3 for print, here’s my perspective on Midway.

  • The “Fateful Five Minutes” as told by Fuchida is not quite myth despite how hard people have tried to debunk him. The Japanese strike groups were very close to being able to launch an attack, and an additional twenty minutes may have been all that’s necessary. If one or two other things went less than optimal for the U.S. forces – e.g. the IJN backing off on Nautilus or one of the SBD groups changing course earlier or later – the Japanese should have been able to at least get an attack wave off before being attacked.
  • For that matter, three of the four Japanese carriers were on fire within the span of about three to eight minutes. At that point even if Hiryu could have scored 2 for 2 it wouldn’t have been enough to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. In that sense I’d say the “five minutes” is very accurate. Whether or not Fuchida saw planes on the flight deck (there probably were fighters, just saying), the results showed for themselves.
  • Walter Lord’s quote on Midway, ““They had no right to win, and yet they did, and in doing so they changed the course of the war,” is not inaccurate. Miracle might be a bit too strong, but I think it was certainly an incredible victory. A few examples:
    • The IJN were hardened veterans. Nagumo’s been directing combined carrier operations for months. In contrast, Hornet was completely green. I’m not trying to discount the bravery or the competence of the American forces, but the Japanese navy were good and we acknowledged that.
    • The US had no way of knowing whether or not the IJN would bring in 4, 5, or 6 carriers. Zuikaku and Shokaku may have been heavily damaged/suffered heavy air group losses, but it wasn’t certain that they would be out of the battle.
    • Counting the air field at Midway, the US still barely had air parity. The numbers of planes in the air might be similar, but the US were operating a smattering of old aircraft. The F4F was barely a match for the A6M, let alone the F2As.
    • Many great books – ranging from Dr. Symond’s Battle of Midway to Parshall & Tully’s Shattered Sword – point out various flaws in Japanese tactics of the day. Many errors and mistakes – such as inadequate scouting or poor fighter discipline – costed Japan the battle, but I think it’s worth mentioning that one should never assume that the enemy’ll be making these mistakes. I don’t think for a second that Gallagher and Best and McClusky and co. went into that battle thinking, “man, the Japanese’s surely going to get arrogant and make dumb mistakes.”
    • The scope of the US victory – the destruction of all of Japan’s carriers – is extraordinary. McClusky and Leslie could not have coordinated that attack together. They could not have known ahead of time that the Japanese were in complete disarray. The attacks could have all gone into Kaga (and it did look like that was the case if it weren’t for a stroke of fortune on Best’s part) and Soryu. And so on and so forth.

You get the idea. As I said, miracle might – can, depending on your inclination – be too strong of a word. These were brave men who did their best to do the jobs they were given. Each went into the battle determined to perform the best he could offer. The rest is really left to the nebulous thing we call fate.

They could have missed. The others could have hit. They could have been shot down before they’d even get to the targets. They could have flew on and on and never even found the Japanese.

But, that is what real life is. Before 10 AM if we were watching the Pacific War we’d say that the Axis still held all the cards. By 11 AM? The tides have definitely changed.

It’s why Sima and I decided to caption our image for the third book the following way.

(We’ll talk lore in the next post)

A turn of fate; an unanticipated change in a sequence of events. I think Midway qualifies. After all, no one enters a battle with the assumption that they’d go in to lose. But I don’t think the US forces went into Midway thinking that they’d be able to score such an incredible victory.

In vol. 3, we’ll be discussing in much greater detail some of the conclusions that the team and I have reached. Until then, I’ll leave you with this quote – found scrawled on one of the US carriers in the day.

“Fortune Favors the Bold.”

[Mail Call] 2017/06/02 – Abyssal edition

First, have a cute Ari.

Secondly, uh, I’ve got a string of somewhat longish questions. Not much to update. Priority of release is still the same (2016 – Silent Service – Pacific 3). Zero’s on a train right now. I’m cranking out pages. Sima and November’s drawing.


“I haven’t checked the site in a long while and it looks like you guys have done a whole lot more! Are characters like Artois still canon?”

Yes.

“Are mail-calls canon? Do they count as Pacific proper lore?”

Yes. Though in the future I will probably further stratify mail call so that some are answered “in-universe” –

Wait a minute…I think I said I’d do that months ago. Derp. Well. Starting from the next one I will probably figure out something to do next time questions of an in-universe nature are asked. That’s about 70% of the questions we get anyways.

“Also, as a follow-up. You have always mentioned that the Pacific Abyssals are meant to be something like faceless ancient horrors with a Lovecraftian vibe. They don’t look very scary to me, though. Any chance you’re going to change that up?”

Hey. Remember, from an out of universe perspective, we get a “bird’s eye” or “God’s eye” view of the Abyssals. You and I get to hear my thinking and the design that goes into each particular Abyssal, as well as their particular strength and weakness. Pacific’s Abyssals are stilted and mechanical. They’re animistic and (the ones shown so far) fairly minimalist.

We see the Abyssals in a well-lit and artistic setting. I mean, that’s just how it is. But look at something like this.

(You can get a higher resolution copy from the electronic version of vol. 1)

This picture looks idyllic enough, but in real life? This would be more or less pitch darkness. It doesn’t matter if you’re a shipgirl or not. This is what you’d be seeing.

Believe me, Sima and I have been talking at length about how to convey horror “tastefully.” We’re interested in creating an atmosphere of unease. However, neither one of us are really interested in the grotesque or the macabre. We believe there are other ways to convey the seriousness of the adversary the shipgirls face.

I mean, the Abyssals exist (from an out of universe perspective) to serve a narrative end. So how to depict them and how to make them scarier is something we’re working on. Within our design, the more “basic” Abyssals look more “natural” – that’s to say, they do look like giant sea critters with weapons strapped onto them.

Our own Abyssal book’ll be a while in the making given how heavy the queue is these days, but all I’ll say is visit again soon. 🙂 You’ll get your scarier Abyssals then.

 

Silent Service XI: Early U.S. Sub Designs (5) – the Argonaut

Hi everyone! Tautog here. I’m back with the next installment of the sub corners.

Honestly sometimes I don’t know if anyone other than me reads them… People seem to be way more interested in bikini-clad shipgirls…

Oh. You read them?

Well. Then. Yay.

Anyways. By now we’ve gotten into the “modern” submarines. Okay, well, not so modern, but the type of submarines developed are beginning to approach how we’d actually use submarines.

At this time, we were still largely running around like headless chickens in terms of designs. But, scared into action by hearing Japan building a lot – up to forty-six large submarines – they went to Congress and asked for more subs. As you know, Congress only authorized the one big sub – that’s Argonaut, which we started to talk about last time.

Now. The Argonaut was big. It was 4,160 tons submerged and 116 meters long. Imagine the length of a football field. That’s pretty close to how long it was. It’s got most of the things that the Navy wanted. Good range – 18,000 nm. Good – okay, okay speed at 10 knots. A big armament load with four bow tubes and sixteen torpedoes in total and two mine tubes (shown in that picture up above). It’s also got two nice big 6’/53 guns to shoot stuff on the surface if it would want.

Now, mines. This particular type of sea mine was very similar to the German designs. If you look up the UE II type submarine, it’s the same idea. The mines were stowed inside the pressure hull in place of a set of after torpedo tubes. They were placed on racks that were kept water tight –  and the racks themselves were complicated pieces of machinery involving worm gears and a lot of moving parts. Though, I’m not sure if I’d like the idea of sleeping right next to mines since the crew compartment was quite literally one section after that!

Yeah… That’s a blueprint of the Argonaut. I’m sorry I’m not quite explaining the rack-mine thing very clearly, so you’re gonna have to squint at the picture to get a better idea of what I’m talking about.

Anyways, the mines that were supposed to be carried by the Argonaut were unique. The Mk. 11 mines had more explosive power than the conventional Mk. 10s, carrying nearly 500 lb of TNT as its explosive charge.

Funny, since the Argonaut never actually laid any of these mines during wartime. 

Wah, you scared me! Hey Argo. Okay. Well. Why don’t you explain this then.

Okay. Sure. So, a couple of issues ended up hampering actual minelaying operations. Logistics is the first one. At the start of the Pacific War, the Navy only had something like 200 Mk. 11 mines on hand. They were, as you can imagine, all for the Argonaut. 

But that’s not really the issue. First of all, nobody really liked the mines. It squeezed a lot of space out of the sub which could be used towards fuel or better living conditions. Secondly, you know how submarines normally laid mines?

Through the torpedo tube?

Yeah. So if you can do that, why bother installing special dedicated mining equipment that gave everyone else trouble? Why make an entirely separate type of mine that only this one submarine could use? Can you imagine how hard it’d be to train submariners given how unique the equipment was? Prototype, one of a kind, special snowflake things belong in the realm of cartoons or video games. They’re absolutely horrid for an actual war. 

Then there was the matter of age. Designed in the 20s, the Argonaut was an old ship by the time we got to the Pacific War. The Navy still harbored ideas that she might perform her original task, but by then, submarine doctrine has evolved considerably and she was needed on other tasks. The Mk 11 were powerful mines, to be sure, but if you look at the Argonaut’s war patrols, she never had “time” to perform a mining operation. What ended up happening was that her huge size found use in other tasks that only submarines of her size could do, and that was the Makin Raid in 1942. 

…Look at it this way. The records say the mining gear wasn’t stripped out of the Argonaut until right before the raid. Not even her refits resulted in the removal of that equipment. I think it’s fairly good to say that the Navy at least still had ideas to have her lay mines.

Yup. The Navy thought that if we mixed up Mk. 11s with the regular Mk. 10s it would be harder to sweep. What ended up happening was that no Mk. 11 mines were actually laid (to my knowledge) during the war. To that I say, what a waste of perfectly good explosives…

Heh. Anyways. Should I?

Oh yeah. I’m done. I just popped in to check on ya is all.

Okay. So. Back to the earlier comment. Again, going back to the mines, the mines made it so that she had very poor surface speed. Remember she should have made 14-15 knots, and could only do 2/3rds of that. This was eventually partially addressed in a refit, but this was one of our slowest submarines that serviced during WW2.

Though, even for her time, there were other strengths that compensated for this particular design weakness. For starters, this was the first time American submarines used that horizontal cylindrical conning tower design, which would eventually become standard. There were plenty of attempts to improve habitability – bigger crew messes with better refrigerator storage, even room for air conditioning later on. It had a periscope with a retractable fairing on it, which reduces vibrations from the wave it forms. It had twice the battery volume of the earlier submarines (240 cells rather than 120), and all in all, she was adequately serviceable.

Oh. It also had a very big gun. The six incher’s shell had twice the destructive potential compared to the 5 inch and also shot straighter. So, definitely something to consider!

But, at the end of the day, these large submarines were not very well received. The submariners hated them because they were awkward and very uncomfortable to work in. The engineering was tough to get right and a lot of equipment complexities and design flaws surfaced which had to be corrected. Congress didn’t like them either because they were very expensive.

To top things off, we weren’t sure if they’d actually do what we’d like them to do during war either. The underpowered engine was a real killer, and again, the low speed…

I know you like to think that all of our submarine designs were complete winners, Tautau. But, you know, some were more winner than others. This one, well. I’m just gonna say. It was a lot less of a winner than the other ones. 

Aw…

She was a good boat. Did what she was supposed to do. Couldn’t ask for more than that. Right?

Right!

Well. See you next time, everyone!