Silent Service XI: Early U.S. Sub Designs (5) – the Argonaut

Hi everyone! Tautog here. I’m back with the next installment of the sub corners.

Honestly sometimes I don’t know if anyone other than me reads them… People seem to be way more interested in bikini-clad shipgirls…

Oh. You read them?

Well. Then. Yay.

Anyways. By now we’ve gotten into the “modern” submarines. Okay, well, not so modern, but the type of submarines developed are beginning to approach how we’d actually use submarines.

At this time, we were still largely running around like headless chickens in terms of designs. But, scared into action by hearing Japan building a lot – up to forty-six large submarines – they went to Congress and asked for more subs. As you know, Congress only authorized the one big sub – that’s Argonaut, which we started to talk about last time.

Now. The Argonaut was big. It was 4,160 tons submerged and 116 meters long. Imagine the length of a football field. That’s pretty close to how long it was. It’s got most of the things that the Navy wanted. Good range – 18,000 nm. Good – okay, okay speed at 10 knots. A big armament load with four bow tubes and sixteen torpedoes in total and two mine tubes (shown in that picture up above). It’s also got two nice big 6’/53 guns to shoot stuff on the surface if it would want.

Now, mines. This particular type of sea mine was very similar to the German designs. If you look up the UE II type submarine, it’s the same idea. The mines were stowed inside the pressure hull in place of a set of after torpedo tubes. They were placed on racks that were kept water tight –  and the racks themselves were complicated pieces of machinery involving worm gears and a lot of moving parts. Though, I’m not sure if I’d like the idea of sleeping right next to mines since the crew compartment was quite literally one section after that!

Yeah… That’s a blueprint of the Argonaut. I’m sorry I’m not quite explaining the rack-mine thing very clearly, so you’re gonna have to squint at the picture to get a better idea of what I’m talking about.

Anyways, the mines that were supposed to be carried by the Argonaut were unique. The Mk. 11 mines had more explosive power than the conventional Mk. 10s, carrying nearly 500 lb of TNT as its explosive charge.

Funny, since the Argonaut never actually laid any of these mines during wartime. 

Wah, you scared me! Hey Argo. Okay. Well. Why don’t you explain this then.

Okay. Sure. So, a couple of issues ended up hampering actual minelaying operations. Logistics is the first one. At the start of the Pacific War, the Navy only had something like 200 Mk. 11 mines on hand. They were, as you can imagine, all for the Argonaut. 

But that’s not really the issue. First of all, nobody really liked the mines. It squeezed a lot of space out of the sub which could be used towards fuel or better living conditions. Secondly, you know how submarines normally laid mines?

Through the torpedo tube?

Yeah. So if you can do that, why bother installing special dedicated mining equipment that gave everyone else trouble? Why make an entirely separate type of mine that only this one submarine could use? Can you imagine how hard it’d be to train submariners given how unique the equipment was? Prototype, one of a kind, special snowflake things belong in the realm of cartoons or video games. They’re absolutely horrid for an actual war. 

Then there was the matter of age. Designed in the 20s, the Argonaut was an old ship by the time we got to the Pacific War. The Navy still harbored ideas that she might perform her original task, but by then, submarine doctrine has evolved considerably and she was needed on other tasks. The Mk 11 were powerful mines, to be sure, but if you look at the Argonaut’s war patrols, she never had “time” to perform a mining operation. What ended up happening was that her huge size found use in other tasks that only submarines of her size could do, and that was the Makin Raid in 1942. 

…Look at it this way. The records say the mining gear wasn’t stripped out of the Argonaut until right before the raid. Not even her refits resulted in the removal of that equipment. I think it’s fairly good to say that the Navy at least still had ideas to have her lay mines.

Yup. The Navy thought that if we mixed up Mk. 11s with the regular Mk. 10s it would be harder to sweep. What ended up happening was that no Mk. 11 mines were actually laid (to my knowledge) during the war. To that I say, what a waste of perfectly good explosives…

Heh. Anyways. Should I?

Oh yeah. I’m done. I just popped in to check on ya is all.

Okay. So. Back to the earlier comment. Again, going back to the mines, the mines made it so that she had very poor surface speed. Remember she should have made 14-15 knots, and could only do 2/3rds of that. This was eventually partially addressed in a refit, but this was one of our slowest submarines that serviced during WW2.

Though, even for her time, there were other strengths that compensated for this particular design weakness. For starters, this was the first time American submarines used that horizontal cylindrical conning tower design, which would eventually become standard. There were plenty of attempts to improve habitability – bigger crew messes with better refrigerator storage, even room for air conditioning later on. It had a periscope with a retractable fairing on it, which reduces vibrations from the wave it forms. It had twice the battery volume of the earlier submarines (240 cells rather than 120), and all in all, she was adequately serviceable.

Oh. It also had a very big gun. The six incher’s shell had twice the destructive potential compared to the 5 inch and also shot straighter. So, definitely something to consider!

But, at the end of the day, these large submarines were not very well received. The submariners hated them because they were awkward and very uncomfortable to work in. The engineering was tough to get right and a lot of equipment complexities and design flaws surfaced which had to be corrected. Congress didn’t like them either because they were very expensive.

To top things off, we weren’t sure if they’d actually do what we’d like them to do during war either. The underpowered engine was a real killer, and again, the low speed…

I know you like to think that all of our submarine designs were complete winners, Tautau. But, you know, some were more winner than others. This one, well. I’m just gonna say. It was a lot less of a winner than the other ones. 

Aw…

She was a good boat. Did what she was supposed to do. Couldn’t ask for more than that. Right?

Right!

Well. See you next time, everyone!

On the role of the “British empire” in Pacific and RNSTEC

Posting Kannnnuuuuuuuu’s Orion shipgirls because I like them and I wish the guy would update already. x)

I’ve been having a discussion with one of our reader pertaining to the implications of Imperialism in the context of Pacific. Specifically, the question was along the lines of what happened during the de-Colonization period and the subsequent collapse of the British Empire.

First of all, the British Empire is more or less still alive (and well, by any definition) in Pacific’s timeline. We do this for a few reasons and you can see my thinking below.

One, it is essential that a major shipgirl power be developed (in the context of Pacific’s world building) in that part of the Old World. As much as I like to throw the Abyssals into the mix and see what gets nommed, I don’t really want to see the collapse of human civilization. The British makes sense and fits this role more or less to a T.

Two. The situation means that it makes more sense that Pacific go down the route of the Great Game 2.0 (with the UK and the USSR) given the far more isolationist role the U.S. ended up playing in Pacific. By the beginning of the Abyssal war, the U.S. maintains very limited forces in the Asia-Pacific and is in the process of de-escalation with the USSR in Europe. It does this both in accordance to national sentiment and strategic reasoning. Strategically, the U.S. places the defense of its twin coasts as the highest priority. In this sense, ironically, the UK and Japan are both at a stronger position due to simply having less area to defend.

From the perspective of national sentiment, the Korean War in Pacific is basically Pacific’s Vietnam. America took absolutely horrendous losses the likes the country has not seen, and the general lack of enthusiasm on the USSR’s part to expand outwardly coupled with war weariness and an ahistorical willingness for the leaders at the helm to cooperate (in secret or otherwise) is looked upon by the historians of Pacific’s universe as an important time period that determined what American exceptionalism (or, as Sune calls it, American Imperialism) looks like.

Again, somewhere, someone is going to fill in the gap. Remember Germany is still going to be split, there’s little sign of the PACT falling apart. Do ya really think Fraunce is going ta be up to ta task  not now Edda  Given the proximity the United Kingdom is, again, the logical world power to take the helm of Europe.

In general, the condition of the British Empire evolved as follows.

  • The United Kingdom maintain significant oversea holdings, foreign territories, and protectorates. While the full extent of which is more or less developed on a case-by-case basis, it’s safe to say that the United Kingdom holds sway over large swaths of Africa and the Middle East.
  • The U.S. and the USSR both tone down their anti-Imperialist rhetoric significantly. The former out of necessity to check communism, the latter deciding that it lack the capability to do so while sorting out internal troubles. This, coupled with some creative governance and a willingness to cooperate with their overseas “partners,” resulted in significant economic improvements in several states friendly to Britain, cementing their willingness to stay associated and (more or less) under Westminster control.
  • As a part of the above, overseas civil disturbances and unrest are significantly less, and the more turbulent/militant nationalist movements fizzled out or advanced far more slowly. The Suez incident dealt a crippling blow to the nascent Pan-Arab movement and the region – well, actually, now that I think about it, it’s not all different from today. Sufficient to say that the various Gulf states found allies in the greater powers, Britain included, which actually gained several new protectorates in the region.
  • Unlike France and Portugal the British in Pacific managed to avert disastrous military interventions in its former colonies/dominions in cases where they do go independent. What this means is that there were a few instances such as intervening in Suez or a India-Pakistan conflict in the 50s where significant force was used, and the Brits lucked out by having them all come out in the Empire’s favor.
  • Britain works out the trade union problems by about the early 70s and begin to do better at home economically around the same time.
  • Given that it holds onto the Middle East, I think you can imagine just how the Brits managed to avert economic disaster.
  • The relationship between the US and the UK is worth mentioning. The “special relationship” is really more of a “natural relationship” in our terms today, but the UK aligned far more often with the US in Pacific on matters where it would have stayed neutral in our real world. “We should remain the closest ally of the US not because they are powerful, but because we share their values” is a lot less ironic in Pacific’s world given a general willingness to cooperate at most levels of government and the significant increase in Britain’s capabilities in comparison to ours.

What this basically means is that the UK is playing roles similar to the US in Pacific. It is, by my comparison, significantly more “imperialist” or expansionist in nature by necessity (and then) and by choice. I’ve tasked the UK with the defense of major continents of humanity because of their historical associations. With great power comes great responsibility, after all.

What this means for Pacific is that the UK is a nation perennially stretched to the limits of its operational capabilities. Unlike STEC, whose highly centralized structure dictated policy as a whole, the RNSTEC (Royal Navy Special Test and Evaluation Command, thank you very much) had thought it would be best to develop their plans and strategies separately. The RNSTEC was more or less split in accordance to the five fleets of the Royal Navy, all of which, you can imagine, wanted shipgirls on hand to protect their own interests in the name of the empire. That means they’d want their own training, their own development, and of course, their own budget.

You can see this might lead to problems similar to the NKT, and you are absolutely correct. However, unlike Japan, which is capable of enacting reforms on an extraordinarily speedy basis, the RNSTEC took a long while to mature and grow. Arguably the most important lesson learned were the incidents in 77 in the Pacific ocean – which involved significant losses to the US Pacific fleet and at Faroe Island – which involved the combat loss of shipgirls.

The incident in 77 is something I’ll probably talk about very soon, because it deals directly with Silent Service and vol. 3 lore. Basically, the US grew proud. It decides to send a large conventional fleet to engage what seemed to be a routine Abyssal attack. The US had plans to announce to the world this threat at the time, and a capable show of force would cement the US as the greatest country on earth and the shield of human civilization.

This is the one time where STEC was ordered to stand down, because well, you know, political and PR reasons.

This is the first time where the Abyssals demonstrated just how good their tech was, and offered humans a glimpse of the terrifying nature of their offensive capabilities.

By the time the shipgirls got there there weren’t much left to save.

The political and international ramifications resulted in a maelstrom in US home politics and a change in the international order. The Abyssal threat, miraculously, was kept secret, and the Abyssals did not attack further for a good eight months. No reason could be guessed why.

The event, however, severely strained US-UK relationships in the shipgirl organizations. STEC was in the process of testing its first rapid-response systems, and it was confident that its intelligence capabilities should be able to observe any changes in the battle accordingly. The attack, for all intent and purposes, looked routine.

Plus, if anything else go wrong, the entirety of the RNSTEC, Asia-Pacific Fleet was exercising a mere half-hour away. Counting shipgirl capabilities the British shipgirls could get there more or less in an instant. So, what was there to worry?

As it stands? The British knew – or maybe they didn’t, it was hard to tell in the confused jumble of reports – about the Abyssal and the attack. Some of the RN shipgirls were armed with live munitions and a full combat load which was definitely unnecessary for the type of formation exercises that the rest of the girls were training. One order even came through to immediately assist the US Pacific fleet at the beginning of the attack and then chaos and bedlam occurred in the command chain. With two admirals of the equivalent rank giving conflicting orders, the RN shipgirls couldn’t even figure out who was in charge.

Many reasons were given, but the RNSTEC shipgirls showed up an hour and a half after the US shipgirls had arrived on scene.

– For the reasons above STEC is highly critical of the inaction taken –


While most were sympathetic, some of the more bellicose individuals in STEC (not to mention a few shipgirls and one shipgirl from the RN) saw this not as incompetence but explicit maliciousness. The more level-headed ones understood implicitly that the sort of finger-pointing and blame would be devastating to humanity’s efforts at combating the Abyssal threat, and every attempt was made (and reciprocated) to make amends.

If there’s some small consolation, it’s that the roots of the modern RNSTEC came out of this event. However, it wouldn’t be until Faroe where the reformation truly takes place. Today’s RNSTEC is organized and structured far more efficiently, and it is probably the second (or third if you ask the Japanese shipgirls) shipgirl organization in the world today.

[Mail Call] 2017/05/28 – Memorial Day & Silent Service Commentary

No special art this time because we’ve got our hands full. This is what we did for last year.


An excerpt from an ancient book on U.S. Submarines, written by a former officer in the submarine service describing the challenges the U.S. navy faced. In this day, 1942, victory was far from certain.

Before he left Washington for Pearl Harbor, Admiral Nimitz realized he was facing an unparalleled defense problem.

Months would pass before the Pacific Fleet could be strongly reinforced. With its surface arm broken and its air arm badly wounded, it could only retreat before the Japanese juggernaut.

Retreat how far? The Japanese must not be permitted to break through the central Pacific or the island chains flanking Australia. Nor could they be allowed to gain a foothold in the Aleutians. A line drawn from Dutch Harbor to Midway, to Samoa, to New Caledonia, to Australia marked the frontier to be held by American and Allied forces.

This is an axiom of warfare. Where concealment is equally available to both sides, it favors the inferior force.

The Philippines invasion supplied naval strategies with notable demonstrations of the axiom. It gave American submarines a narrow margin which enabled them to operate in enemy-infested seas and carry out their primary mission – the destruction of Japanese shipping.

The Imperial Navy did not lose a single major unit during the Philippines invasion. But as the Japanese moved down the Malay barrier they began to lose merchant ships here and there. And with the advent of the New Year, ships started going down the Coasts of Japan. American submarines were beginning the war of attrition.

Submarine forces in the Pacific “got in there” and fought. The Manila boats diverted the enemy’s naval vanguard and impeded the drive on the Netherlands East Indies. Pearl Harbor submarines joined battle in the Central Pacific, patrolled the line extending from Australia to the Aleutians, drove over to the East China Sea and cut the shipping lanes to Japan.

With Mid-Pacific bases lost – with Asiatic bases lost – with air cover lost – the Pacific Fleet immobilized – supplies cut off – spare parts lost – Manila torpedoes captured – with all these disadvantages, the submarines entered the conflict and kept on going.

They kept on going, despite the fact that the enemy had the initiative. The fact that the S-boats were old and the enemy destroyers new – that Japanese bombs were known to contain an explosive charge greater than any at the time developed by the Allies. Loss of forward bases, fleet support, repair facilities, stores – these never imperiled the submarines as did torpedo failure. For almost two years American submarines went into action handicapped by a defective torpedo.

In spite of all this and all other handicaps, the submariners led the United States offensive. They aided in the defense of Midway and battled the foe in the Aleutians. They helped to parry the enemy’s thrust at Guadalcanal. They blocked the ports of the Jap home Empire. Laid mines. Reconnoitered for air strikes. Rescued refugees. Served as lifeguard. Struck the Imperial navy some of the hardest blows it ever received. Swept the merchant fleets of the Rising Sun from the Central and Southwest Pacific. Penetrated the Sea of Japan. And finally halted at the beachheads of Kyushu, Shikoku, Hokkaido, and Honshu.

Above all, the US submarines accomplished the No. 1 purpose of the submarine force. They sank ships.

Composed of no more than 1.6% of the navy’s personnel, this comparable service arm accounted for 73% of Japanese ship losses from all causes during the first two years of the Pacific war. The final score, verified by post-war inquest, credits the US submarine fleet with sinking 54.7% of the Japanese merchantmen and 29% of Japanese naval vessels in World War II.